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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-AsSESSING THE MEDIA'S RIGHT: 
COPYING AUDIO AND VIDEO TAPES PLAYED AS EVIDENCE IN CRIM­
INAL TRIALS 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1986, three United States Courts of Appeals addressed for the 
first time the issue of the media's right to copy audio and video tape 
materials admitted and played as evidence in criminal trials.! In de­
ciding these cases, each court of appeals attempted to identify the 
proper scope of the media's substantive rights concerning these 
requests. 2 
In defining the proper scope of the media's right, the appellate 
courts have looked to the Supreme Court for guidance, beginning with 
the case of Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc. 3 Warner Commu­
nications is the only Supreme Court case to examine directly the legiti­
macy of the media's claim of a right of access to evidentiary 
recordings. Since its decision in Warner Communications, the 
Supreme Court has issued opinions recognizing the public's and the 
media's right to have open criminal trial proceedings, but has not 
ruled explicitly on the evidentiary recordings issue.4 Part I of this 
I. Valley Broadcasting Co. v. District Court, 798 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1986); United 
States v. Webbe, 791 F.2d 103 (8th CiT. 1986); United States v. Beckham, 789 F.2d 401 
(6th Cir. 1986). 
Audio and video tape materials admitted as evidence in criminal trials will hereinafter 
be referred to as "evidentiary recordings." All of the evidentiary recordings discussed in 
this comment had been played in open court, where the jury and the public had an oppor­
tunity to hear or see them. 
2. The role of the federal courts of appeals in defining the scope of the media's right 
is central. Their role is to review the district court or trial court judges' decisions which 
grant or deny media access to copy requested materials. The appellate court determines if a 
lower court judge has considered the proper factors (which are discussed in this comment) 
and has given them each appropriate weight in deciding whether the media can copy the 
desired materials. In this way, the courts of appeals largely determine the extent of the 
media's right to copy evidentiary recordings within their circuits. 
3. 435 U.S. 589 (1978). There were four opinions in Warner Communications. Jus­
tice Powell wrote the majority opinion and Justices White, Marshall, and Stevens each 
wrote separate dissenting opinions. See infra note 36. 
4. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 106 S. Ct. 2735 (1986) [hereinafter 
Press-Enterprise II] (recognizing right to open preliminary hearing); Press-Enterprise Co. v. 
Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) [hereinafter Press-Enterprise I] (recognizing right to 
open jury selection); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (recog­
nizing right of access to "sensitive information"); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 
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comment examines the Supreme Court's decision in Nixon v. Warner 
Communications, Inc., as well as the Court's prior and subsequent de­
cisions which play an important role in determining the extent of the 
media's right to copy evidentiary recordings. Issues left unresolved by 
the Warner Communications decision are also discussed. 
After the landmark decision in Warner Communications, three 
federal courts of appeals confronted the issue of the media's right to 
copy evidentiary recordings obtained in the Federal Bureau of Investi­
gation's Abscam probes. 5 During this same period, two other federal 
courts of appeals also considered, in different contexts, the extent of 
the media's right to copy evidentiary recordings. 6 These early opin­
ions served as significant precedent in the recent decisions attempting 
to define the scope of the media's rig4t. Part II of this comment traces 
and describes these early opinions and their implications. 
Part III of this comment focuses on the recent decisions and cur­
rent definitions of the scope of the media's right to copy evidentiary 
recordings. This section includes a description of the influence of both 
Supreme Court and earlier federal courts of appeals opinions on recent 
adjudications, and the implications of these recent decisions for lower 
court judges in ruling on future media requests. Finally, Part IV of 
this comment summarizes the current status of the media's right to 
copy, and calls for recognition of an appropriate and uniform standard 
of review for media requests. 
448 U.S. 555 (1980) (recognizing right to open courtroom). Richmond Newspapers and its 
progeny are discussed in the context of the development of a general right of access stan­
dard in Note, What Ever Happened to "The Right to Know"?: Access to Government Con­
trolled Information Since Richmond Newspapers, 73 VA. L. REV. 1111 (1987). 
5. In re Application of NBC, 653 F.2d 609 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (United States v. Jen­
rette); In re Application of NBC, 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981) (United States v. Criden); In 
re Application of NBC, 635 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980) (United States v. Myers). 
Abscam was the name given to an undercover operation designed to observe United 
States Congressmen in the act of taking bribes for influence, a federal crime. FBI agents 
posed as Middle Eastern businessmen who offered large amounts of cash to the congress­
men in return for promises of help in such governmental matters as the businessmen's 
immigration. The congressmen were recorded on video and audio tape arranging for, and 
accepting the bribes. The tape recordings were the principal evidence offered at trial to 
convict the congressmen, and also were the subject of the media's request to copy. See 
Myers, 635 F.2d at 947-49. For a more detailed description of the Abscam operation, see F. 
BERMAN, THE LESSONS OF ASSCAM (1982). 
6. /11 re Video-Indiana, Inc., 672 F.2d 1289 (7th Cir. 1982) (United States v. Ed­
wards); Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981). 
For a discussion of the media's right to copy in light of both these cases and the 
Abscam cases see Comment, The Common Law Right of Public Access When Audio and 
Video Tape Evidence in a Court Record is Sought for Purposes ofCopying and Dissemination 
to the Public, 28 Loy. L. REV. 163 (1982). 
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I. GUIDANCE FROM ABOVE: THE SUPREME COURT 
A. The Supreme Court Addresses the Right to Copy 
Analyzing Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc. 7 is essential to 
understanding the development of the media's right to copy eviden­
tiary recordings because Warner Communications is the only Supreme 
Court decision addressing that precise issue.8 In the Warner Commu­
nications opinions, the Court examined the media's claims to both a 
constitutional right and a common law right to copy audio tapes intro­
duced and played as evidence.9 Warner Communications also is im­
portant because of its extensive use as precedent. Since the case was 
decided in 1978, every federal court of appeals to consider the issue of 
the media's right to copy evidentiary recordings has either followed 
Warner Communications or cited it as controlling. \0 
Any detailed description of the opinions in Warner Communica­
tions must begin with an understanding of the case's background. In 
Warner Communications, the Supreme Court reviewed a decision of 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to grant the 
media an opportunity to copy tapes introduced at trials stemming 
from the Watergate break-in and subsequent investigations. 11 The ap­
pellate court, in United States v. Mitchell,12 ruled on the validity of 
District Court Judge Sirica's order l3 which prohibited television net­
works and others l4 from making copies of the tapes. 15 
7. 435 U.S. 589 (1978). 
8. Id. at 597. 
9. Id. at 597-608. The Court also considered the various claims of the parties seeking 
to deny access to the tapes. Id. See infra notes 28-30, 32 and accompanying text. 
10. Courts look to Warner Communications for guidance because it is the only 
United States Supreme Court case that addressed a fact pattern in which the media re­
quested an opportunity to copy evidentiary recordings and an opposing party objected to 
that request. It is the similarity in fact pattern and the Court's descriptive language which 
makes the case the obvious first choice of appellate courts looking for Supreme Court gui­
dance on the media's right to copy. However, there are significant differences between the 
fact pattern in Warner Communications and the patterns in the federal appellate court 
cases. The degree of precedential value given Warner Communications is one of the focuses 
of the dispute over the scope of the media's right. See infra note 43. 
II. Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589 (1978), rev'd on other grounds 
sub nom. United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
12. 551 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
13. The procedural background of Judge Sirica's order is somewhat complicated; a 
summary precedes the appellate decision. Id. at 1255-57. It is sufficient here to say that his 
particular order was without prejudice, and all that the appellate court reviewed was 
whether Judge Sirica abused his discretion by delaying the release of the tapes because of 
possible prejudice to the defendants (because their appeals were pending and new trials 
might have been ordered). 
14. The three commercial television networks, (ABC, NBC and CBS), the Public 
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The majority in Mitchell began by analyzing the common law 
right to inspect and copy public records. 16 The court traced the right 
back to its English origins,17 and stated that American courts tradi­
tionally have granted access to public records to "all taxpayers and 
citizens."18 Next, the Mitchell court found that the common law right 
to inspect public records extended to judicial records as well. 19 The 
court viewed this extension of the right as fundamental to the effective 
Broadcasting System, the Radio Television News Directors Association, and a large manu­
facturer of phonograph records (Warner Communications) sought to copy the tapes. Id. at 
1254. 
15. The tapes sought by the media were portions offormer President Nixon's "White 
House tapes" that had been played before the jury at the criminal trials of several of 
Nixon's top aides. The trial court subpoenaed the tapes from President Nixon against his 
will and the Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), upheld the 
subpoena. Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1254, 1255. 
16. Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1257-60. It has been suggested that the right to inspect and 
the right to copy are totally distinguishable. See Note, Copying and Broadcasting Video 
and Audio Tape Evidence: A Threat to the Fair Trial Right, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 551, 556 
(1982). 
17. Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1257. 
18. Id. (citing State ex rei. Colscott v. King, 154 Ind. 621, 57 N.E. 535 (1900), and 
other cases). 
The Mitchell court discussed the common law right of access to public records as it 
arose at state common law. The court did not apply any specific state's substantive law to 
the issue, but instead integrated "well-settled" state law to fashion its own law of independ­
ent federal judicial decision. Id. at 1258. 
The Supreme Court has sanctioned the formulation of a "federal common law." In 
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943), rather than apply the 
Erie doctrine and look to state law for the rule of decision, the Court fashioned its own 
federal substantive rule of law. The Court developed this federal common law to protect 
federal interests where the parties' rights and duties were imposed by federal law (the Con­
stitution and federal statutes), yet Congress had not specifically revised a rule of decision. 
Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1258. See also D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 
315 U.S. 447, 471-72 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring). The basis of the technique rests on 
the federal nature of the function involved, not that the United States is a party. Mishkin, 
The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National 
and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 801 (1957). 
In Mitchell, as well as the other cases discussed in this comment, the accused is 
charged with federal crimes and federal law (both the Constitution and federal statutes) 
determines the parties' rights and duties. The fact that the court formulates a federal com­
mon law to govern the case is, therefore, not surprising. See Monaghan, The Supreme 
Court 1974 Term. Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. I, 10-26 
(1975); Friendly, In Praise ofErie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 383, 410, 421-22 (1964). . 
See also Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1526-31 (1969); 
Note, Federal Common Law, 30 OR. L. REV. 164 (1951); Note, Exceptions to Erie v. 
Tompkins: The Survival of Federal Common Law, 59 HARV. L. REV. 966 (1946). See 
generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S 
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 765-70 (1973). 
19. Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1258 ("Any attempt to maintain secrecy, as to the records 
of this court, would seem to be inconsistent with the common understanding of what be­
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functioning of a democratic state. 20 
In considering the importance of this common law right, the 
Mitchell court commented on the influences of the first, fifth, sixth, 
and fourteenth amendments in strengthenIng the common law right to 
inspect and copy judicial records. 21 The court concluded this section 
of the opinion by stating that it only referred to the constitutional pro­
visions to "underscore the importance of the values that the common 
law right seeks to protect, and to make clear our duty to tread care­
fully in this important area."22 The court then declared that the com­
mon law right to inspect and copy judicial records applied to 
"exhibits."23 The Mitchell court also delineated the scope of the com­
mon law right to inspect and copy judicial records as applied to evi­
dentiary recordings. It emphasized that the right was not absolute, 
and that "[b]ecause no clear rules can be articulated as to when judi­
cial records should be closed to the public, the decision to do so neces­
sarily rests within the sound discretion of the courts, subject to 
appellate review for abuse. "24 
longs to a public court of record, to which all persons have the right of access ....") 
(quoting Ex parte Drawbaugh, 2 App. D.C. 404, 407-08 (1894». 
20. Id. The court said, "A popular Government without popular information, or the 
means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy: or perhaps both. . .. A 
people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which 
knowledge gives." Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting a letter from James Madison to W.T. 
Barry, Aug. 4, 1822, in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Hunt ed. 1910». 
21. Id. The Mitchell court stated the constitutional connections thus: "Like the 
First Amendment, then, the right of inspection serves to produce 'an informed and enlight­
ened public opinion.''' Id. (citing Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 247 
(1936». 
Concerning the sixth amendment the court said, "Like the public trial guarantee of the 
Sixth Amendment, the right serves to 'safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts 
as instruments of persecution,' to promote the search for truth, and to assure 'confidence in 
... judicial remedies.''' Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 & 
n.24 (1948». 
The court also said, "[L]ike the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the right of in­
spection serVes to promote equality by providing those who were and those who were not 
able to gain entry to [a] ... cramped courtroom the same opportunity to hear the ... 
tapes." Id. 
22. Id. at 1259. The court reached this conclusion because it was able to hold in 
favor of the media without resorting to the purely constitutional question. A strong com­
mon law right was sufficient to overcome the arguments of the respondents who sought to 
deny access. 
23. Id. at 1260. The actual physical tapes which had been played in open court as 
evidence in the trials were considered "exhibits" in this case. 
24. Id. Similar statements are prevalent throughout the cases which address the me­
dia's right to copy. There is considerable difference in the amount of judicial discretion 
allowed among the jurisdictions, and thus the issue of trial judge discretion is a source of 
continuing debate. See infra note 42. 
104 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:99 
While leaving the decision to the discretion of the trial judge, the 
Mitchell court did not leave the judges without any guidance. The 
court contoured its definition of the scope of the common law right by 
stating that any incursions on the right should be made only when 
"justice so requires."25 The court also stated that" '[a] trial is a public 
event,''' and "'what transpires in the court room is public prop­
erty.' "26 Before considering the arguments for and against denying 
access, the Mitchell court noted that "once an exhibit is publicly dis­
played [in open court], the interests in subsequently denying access to 
it necessarily will be diminished."21 
Next, the Mitchell court, in defining the media's right, considered 
the specific arguments of those seeking to deny or gain access to copy 
in that case. The court heard arguments that release of the tapes 
would prejUdice the defendants' rights by making it impossible to im­
panel an impartialjury.28 It also considered the privacy rights of those 
25. Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1260. 
26. Id. at 1261 (footnote omitted) (quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 
(1947)). 
27. Id. This argument is a major theme running through the right to copy cases. 
The defendant's claim that pUblicity may hurt the fair operation of the trial is diminished 
when an item has been displayed. This is because the press may report what they have 
heard in the courtroom, which necessarily leads to a certain amount of publicity. If the 
tapes are disseminated to the public, the only increased danger to the defendant's trial is the 
incremental increase in publicity over and above that which would already exist. In a case 
where a tape has been introduced as evidence, but not played in the courtroom because the 
tape's mere existence is its only evidentiary use, the difference in publicity after tape dis­
semination would be much greater. 
It is important to note that in the right to copy cases discussed in this comment, the 
media is requesting only those tapes which have been played in open court. Recordings 
withheld from the public in the courtroom do not warrant the full weight of the arguments 
behind full public access to tapes played in open court. 
28. The possible prejudice to the defendants' fair trial was Judge Sirica's principal 
reason for denying access. See supra note 13. The Mitchell court recognized that the only 
risk of prejudice was that which would occur at a possible second trial. The court deemed 
this risk insufficient to outweigh the right to access because: (I) there always may be a 
pending appeal; (2) the risk of not finding an impartial jury is small; and (3) in this particu­
lar case the defendants themselves were not overly concerned about the release of the tapes. 
Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1261-63. 
This aspect of the right to copy is usually the central area for dispute among the courts 
of appeals. One of the courts' (and the defendants') major concerns is that the defendants 
may not get fair trials. Arguably, if publicity endangers trials, the courts should protect 
against it whenever the danger is recognized. On the other hand, there is a point at which 
the risk of danger to fair trials is so remote that the interests of the media necessarily 
outweigh a judicially imposed restriction on the dissemination of information. This dis­
pute, in its basic form, centers on how much the publicity from disseminated evidentiary 
recordings affects the public as a whole, and thus the courts' ability to impanel impartial 
juries at subsequent trials. 
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recorded on the tapes,29 together wid;. the increased "national inter­
est" in the material on the tapes, because the tapes included recordings 
of high government officials. 30 
In Warner Communications, the Supreme Court reviewed the 
Mitchell decision and, in a five to four decision, reversed Mitchell, 
holding that neither the right of the press nor that of the public re­
quired release of the tapes in question. 3 ) The Supreme Court first ad­
dressed the common law right to access. After recognizing its 
29. The Mitchell court stated that the privacy argument of President Nixon (while 
not a defendant, Nixon asserted that as a party on the tapes, his privacy interest necessarily 
was affected) was insufficient to overcome the media's right to copy. This was because the 
tapes' content was not personal or intimate conversation, but was conversation between 
business associates concerning matters of national and governmental importance. The only 
embarrassment to any party on the tapes would arise out of these unprotected discussions. 
Id. at 1263-64. 
The issue of the parties' privacy is central in most of the right to copy cases. Some 
courts are willing to protect the parties on the tapes from possible embarrassment. See 
United States v. Webbe, 791 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Edwards, 672 F.2d 
1289 (7th Cir. 1982); Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. Unit A 
Aug. 1981). Other courts have reasoned, like the court in Mitchell, that when the conver­
sations on the tapes do not involve personal material but, in fact, contain material of high 
public interest, the parties' privacy concerns are minimal. See Valley Broadcasting Co. v. 
District Court, 798 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 945 (2d 
Cir. 1980). 
Additionally, pre-recorded depositions played in open court have been recognized as 
warranting no special privacy protection because recorded deposition testimony is consid­
ered "before the public." United States v. Salerno, 828 F.2d 958, 960 (2d Cir. 1987). 
30. Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1264. The Mitchell court noted that the "national interest" 
increased the public interest in the tapes, and therefore, the right to copy. Id. 
This is another prevalent argument in the right to copy cases. Usually, the requested 
tapes involve public figures on trial for a crime, and there is heightened public interest 
because of their positions. Some courts reason that the public interest in the tapes is not a 
factor to be considered when the defendants' fair trial rights might be in jeopardy, and 
moreover, that because of pervasive skepticism about public officials, increased public 
awareness of a public figure's trial may lead to a greater possibility of an unfair trial. The 
opposing argument is that the public's right to information is made even stronger when the 
information concerns the government, because one of the essential ingredients of an effec­
tive self-governing state is the dissemination of information about government officials and 
government activities. See supra note 20. 
Judge MacKinnon's dissenting opinion in Mitchell focused on the parties' property 
rights in the tapes and the interest in protecting the tapes' physical integrity. Mitchell, 551 
F.2d at 1265-66 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). These two minor arguments are disposed of 
in most of the other cases. The property right argument is criticized because once the tapes 
are played in the courtroom, the words themselves are considered public property. See 
supra text accompanying note 26. With regard to the physical integrity of the tapes, it 
seems reasonable that the original tapes could be protected from physical damage during 
copying. See infra text accompanying note 132. 
31. Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion. Justice Brennan joined Justice White's 
opinion which, although dissenting in part, substantially agreed with the majority. Justices 
Marshall and Stevens filed dissenting opinions which departed significantly from the major­
ity. See infra note 36. 
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applicability to the tapes in question, the Court listed former President 
Nixon's arguments against releasing the tapes. President Nixon ar­
gued for protecting his privacy interests, for protecting accuracy, and 
for protecting against embarrassment and commercialization.32 The 
media's arguments centered on the need for public understanding, the 
presumption in favor of public access to judicial records, and the fact 
that there already had been wide dissemination of printed transcripts 
of the tapes.33 
Instead of assigning weight to the interests advanced by the par­
ties and striking a balance between those interests as framed by the 
case's facts and arguments, as the Court normally would do in such a 
case,34 it claimed that the existence of the Presidential Recordings Act 
made release of the tapes improper.35 The Court refused to balance 
the competing interests because the availability of a congressionally 
created alternative means of access "tips the scales" against the me­
dia's request. 36 The presence of alternative means of public access be­
32. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589, 599-602 (1978). President Nixon's 
claims were basically the same as those in the Mitchell case and were discussed by the 
Supreme Court using the language of that case. The Court seemed to be leaning toward 
agreement with the Mitchell court on evaluating the President's arguments. The Court 
recognized the existence 'of his arguments as factors to be considered, but did not address 
their weight. President Nixon's claim of a property right was treated similarly. Id. at 597­
602. President Nixon continued the property claim in another suit against the government 
for damages for loss of property. 
The claims of possible future prejudice to the Watergate defendants were not at issue 
because there were no more pending trials or appeals concerning persons on the tapes. The 
final decision in Warner Communications, in 1978, was at least two years after the final 
Watergate convictions and appeals. Id. at 602 n.14. 
33. Id. at 602. Once again, the Supreme Court recognized and discussed these fac­
tors in light of the Mitchell decision, but did not rule conclusively on their weight. Id. 
34. Id. at 602 ("[W]e normally would be faced with the task of weighing the interests 
advanced by the parties in light of the public interest and the duty of the courts."). 
35. Id. at 603. 
36. Id. at 606. Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 
93-526, §§ 101-106,88 Stat. 1695-98 (1974) (codified as amended at 44 U.S.c. § 2111 (1982 
& Supp. III 1985)). Congress created the Act to direct the General Services Administrator 
to supervise a process of screening the materials for private matter, and releasing matters of 
historical importance. The Court called the Act's existence a "unique element" of this 
right to copy case and the reason for not balancing the arguments of the parties. Warner 
Communications, 435 U.S. at 603. 
Justice White's separate opinion, with which Justice Brennan joined, agreed that the 
Act was dispositive in the case, but argued that the tapes held by the district court should 
be sent to the Administrator for processing immediately. /d. at 611-12 (White, J., dissent· 
ing in part). 
Justice Marshall dissented, concluding that the media's right was strong and that the 
Act, if anything, supported the media's request because its existence admitted that the in­
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came the controlling factor in denying release.37 
At the end of its opinion, the Court commented on the media's 
constitutional claims. Holding that neither the first amendment free­
dom of the press guarantee nor the sixth amendment right to a public 
trial required the tapes' release,38 the Court interpreted Cox Broad­
casting Corp. v. Cohn 39 to mean that the press has no more right than 
the public to information that is a matter of public record.40 The 
formation on the tapes was suitable for public dissemination. Id. at 612-13 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
Justice Stevens dissented because he agreed with Justice Marshall and believed that 
the trial judge (here speaking of the first trial level decision to release the tapes, the order 
altered by Judge Sirica but affirmed by the ruling of the appellate court) was in the best 
position to determine the conditions surrounding a media request, and therefore, the judge 
should make the decision to grant or deny the request absent the Supreme Court's interfer­
ence. Id. at 614-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
37. For a discussion of the concept of alternative means of access in the context of 
several cases where the press sought government-held information, see Note, Press Access to 
Government-Controlled Information and the Alternative Means Test, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1279 
(1981) (Warner Communications discussed at 1287-88). 
38. The Court held that these purely constitutional arguments were not valid be­
cause the media could not assert correctly that the first or sixth amendments directly ap­
plied to a media request to copy evidentiary recordings. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 
at 609-1Q. The Court did not consider, in contrast to the Mitchell court, that these consti­
tutional claims represented values which could intensify a common law right to copy. Id. 
For a summary of the values served by the constitutional provisions and the common 
law right, see supra note 21. 
39. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). Cox recognized that "freedom of expression guaranteed by 
the first and fourteenth amendments precluded a state from imposing civil liability for pub­
lication of accurate information properly obtained from official records open to the public" 
which identified a rape victim. Recent Case, 14 DUQ. L. REV. 507, 508 (1976). 
40. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 608-09. See also Houchins v. KQED, 438 
U.S. 1 (1978). In Houchins, news broadcasters sought permission to inspect and take pic­
tures within a county jail in order to disseminate information to the public about alleged 
poor conditions there. !d. at 3-4. The Supreme Court upheld the limitation on access 
imposed by the jail officials, thereby giving the press no more access than was allowed to 
the public on regular tours. Id. at 4-16. See Note, No Special Right of Press Access to 
Information, 53 TuL. L. REV. 629 (1979). 
The media's response to this argument is that they seek to copy and disseminate to the 
public no more than the public would have a right to observe had the public been able to be 
present in the courtroom, and that their role is substitutionary for those not able to be 
present. The press argues, therefore, that they are not seeking more access than the general 
public, just effective access for the wider public. 
The decision in Houchins is also important for its discussion and denial of the public's 
claim of a constitutional right to government-held information about jails. Houchins, 438 
U.S. at 8-15. An analogy might be drawn between government-held information about jail 
conditions and government-held information from a trial. This analogy supports the prop­
osition that the public's right to evidentiary recordings should be limited in the same way 
as the public's right to information about jail conditions. However, the government's inter­
est in a jail access case is the secure operation of the jail; in a request for evidentiary record­
ings, the government's interest is in a fair trial. The disparity in government interests 
weakens the argument for similar treatment of the cases. In addition, the Supreme Court . 
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Warner Communications Court also reasoned that the right to a public 
trial is satisfied by the ability of the press and the public to attend the 
trial and report on what they had observed.41 
What is important to derive from Warner Communications is a 
sense of what the Court did not say. It did not identify or weigh all of 
the arguments for or against media copying under the common law 
right, and it gave little guidance as to the proper weight of each in 
striking a balance among them. It never coupled the constitutional 
claims of the press with the common law right in order to give that 
right more support. Nor did the Court specifically address the major 
right to be protected by denying a media request, that being the de­
fendant's right to a fair trial. The Court seemed to accept the fact that 
appellate courts would have to make these determinations on their 
own, and said that the decision to grant or deny access should in the 
future be left to the sound discretion of the trial judge.42 
Another unanswered question is the extent to which the Supreme 
Court approves of the Mitchell court's approach. It is difficult to de­
termine if the Court's avoidance of a clear disagreement with the 
Mitchell approach in some way makes Mitchell acceptable. In the face 
of this uncertainty, appellate courts are left with the problem of how 
to apply Warner Communications to media requests to copy. Argua­
bly, the variety of interpretations among later decisions is attributable 
to the issues left unresolved by the majority opinion in Warner 
Communications. 
There are two ways to view the precedential effect of Warner 
Communications. It can be viewed as the final word of the Supreme 
Court on the issue of media requests to copy evidentiary recordings, 
leading courts to try to find a standard for review of media requests 
within its language. Alternatively, it can be viewed as a decision lim­
made clear in its later decision in Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 
(1980), that the public's access to criminal trials, unlike access to other areas of governmen­
tal operation, is specially protected by the first amendment. See infra text accompanying 
notes 44-48. 
41. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 610. In Warner Communications, the 
press was allowed to attend the trial, obtain transcripts of the tapes, and print and report on 
any materials that they already possessed. Id. 
The opportunity of the press and public to attend the trial and report on what they 
observed was the fatal blow to the media's sixth amendment (right to a public trial) claim. 
Therefore, the Court gave the impression that a trial is deemed public when the courtroom 
doors are open, and the purposes behind the sixth amendment right to a public trial are 
satisfied if those in the courtroom can tell others what they observed. 
42. [d. The holding is unclear on the amount of sound discretion afforded the trial 
judge. This lack of clarity results in variation among the circuits in the level of discretion 
allowed to trial judges. [d. 
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ited by its own facts, meaning that courts must look beyond it for clues 
about the proper standard of review for media requests to copy.43 
B. The Supreme Court's Concern for Open Trials 
A line of Supreme Court cases in which the Court addressed the 
issue of the public's right to attend criminal trials (as well as the me­
dia's right) influenced some of the appellate decisions regarding media 
requests to copy evidentiary recordings. In Richmond Newspapers, 
Inc. v. Virginia,44 the Supreme Court held that the first amendment 
assures the press and the public the right to have criminal trials open 
to them.45 The Court based its reasoning, in part, on the need to pre­
serve first amendment interests of an informed public dialogue on ar­
eas of governmental operation. The Court also was concerned with 
protecting the right of the press and public to have an opportunity to 
be physically present in the public areas of the courtroom. 46 
It is possible to view the Richmond Newspapers decision as totally 
unrelated to the issue of media requests to copy. The holding can be 
interpreted as protecting press attendance at criminal trials, but con­
ferring no special right on the press to do anything more than report 
on what they have observed. This position seems consistent with the 
holding in Warner Communications because that case also did not 
43. The dispute over the precedential value of Warner Communications is not based 
solely on the fact that the special nature of the Presidential Recordings Act, as an alterna­
tive means for public dissemination, may make the Court's discussion of the parties' claims 
mere dicta. Also at issue is the relevance of who is seeking to prevent the copying. In 
Warner Communications, President Nixon sought to prevent the copying mostly for pri­
vacy reasons. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 600-01. In virtually all of the other 
cases, it is the defendants, arguing that their fair trial right is in jeopardy, who oppose the 
media's request. For a list of several such cases, see supra notes I, 5,6. Compare United 
States v. Salerno, 828 F.2d 958 (2d Cir. 1987). 
For analysis of Warner Communications and the dispute over its significance, see 
Note, Recognizing a Constitutional Right of Media Access to Evidentiary Recordings in 
Criminal Trials, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 121 (1983). 
44. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
45. Id. at 576-77. Richmond Newspapers is a case in which the media successfully 
prevented a continued "closure" of a murder trial. The trial judge had ordered the closure, 
which kept the press and the public out of the courtroom. The case has been discussed 
extensively. See, e.g., Note, supra note 4; Note, The First Amendmel1l Right of Access to 
Government-Held In/ormation: A Re-evaluation After Richmond Newspapers. Inc. v. Vir­
ginia, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 292 (1982); Comment, Is the Right of Access to Trials an 
Instance o/a First Amendment Right to Know?, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 831 (1981); Note, The 
Public's Right to Access Versus the Right to a Fair Trial: A Balancing Compromise, 33 
BAYLOR L. REV. 191 (1981); Note, A Foot in the Government's Door-Access Rights o/the 
Press and Public: Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 12 U. ToL. L. REV. 991 (1981). 
46. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575-78. 
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confer a special right of access on the media.47 
In contrast, the decision in Richmond Newspapers can be viewed 
as influential in determining the proper standard of review for media 
requests to copy. By articulating a first amendment interest in pre­
serving the public's rights to information and physical presence in the 
courtroom, the Supreme Court in Richmond Newspapers strengthened 
the arguments in favor of granting media requests to copy.48 
The Supreme Court repeated the theme that it is important for 
the public to have access to information at criminal trials in the recent 
cases of Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (I and IJJ.49 In those 
cases, the Supreme Court recognized, under the first amendment guar­
antee of open public proceedings in criminal trials, the constitutional 
right of the public to attend both jury selection and preliminary hear­
ings.so In the Press-Enterprise cases, the Court reaffirmed the reason­
ing of Richmond Newspapers,S! and summarized the Supreme Court's 
47. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 609. See supra note 40. 
48. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575-76. Those arguments are that granting 
media requests to copy will preserve the public's first amendment interests by leading to a 
greater public understanding based on accurate information, and that the media, through 
copying evidentiary recordings, playa substitutionary role for the members of the public 
who are unable to be present at the trial. 
See also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). In that case, 
the Court stated that the right of access applied to "sensitive information" which arose out 
of a minor's rape trial. The Globe Newspaper Co. opinion is important because it estab­
lished a standard by which parts of a criminal trial may be closed to the pUblic: "Where, as 
in the present case, the State attempts to deny the right of access in order to inhibit the 
disclosure of sensitive information, it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a 
compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." Id. at 
606-07. 
49. Press-Enterprise II, 106 S. Ct. 2735 (1986); Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501 
(1984). 
50. Press-Enterprise I arose in connection with a rape trial in which the State of 
California sought to keep the press out of the voir dire jury selection process in order to 
protect against the dissemination of personal and sensitive material disclosed in some of the 
proceedings. The State of California sought to protect the privacy rights of the potential 
jurors. In denying the state's request, the Court reasoned that traditionally, jury selection 
had been open to the public and that open jury selection enhances both trial fairness and 
public confidence in the criminal justice system. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 505-10. 
Press-Enterprise II arose in connection with a multiple murder trial. The defendant 
. sought to close the preliminary hearing to protect his fair trial right. 	 In denying the de­
fendant's request, the Court stated that, like the parts of the trial considered in Richmond 
Newspapers, Globe Newspaper Co., and Press-Enterprise I, preliminary hearings tradition­
ally had been open, and that their openness is no less essential to the proper functioning of 
the criminal justice system than public access to the trial itself. Press-Enterprise II, 106 S. 
Ct. at 2742. 
51. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 509. (" 'People in an open society do not 
demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they 
are prohibited from observing.' Closed proceedings, although not absolutely precluded, 
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attitude toward actively protecting the rights of the press and public to 
obtain information from criminal trials. 52 Thus, an apparent trend of 
the Court is to extend first amendment principles to more aspects of a 
trial. 
Considering evidentiary recordings as one aspect of the trial, and 
thus within the purview of the Court's expanding protection, is a rea­
sonable response to the Supreme Court's reasoning in Richmond 
Newspapers and the Press-Enterprise cases. Disseminating information 
to the public in the form of evidentiary recordings, especially in cases 
involving public officials, seems even more vitally connected to the 
purposes stated in the Press-Enterprise cases than open jury selection 
or pre-trial proceedings. The information contained on the tapes is 
more useful in generating public dialogue. In forming opinions about 
what has transpired in the courtroom, evidence is more important to 
the public than jury selection or pre-trial hearings because evidence is 
more directly related to the crime charged and is often more essential 
to the outcome of the case. 
In the decisions concerning the media's and the public's right to 
open trials and the right to information from trials, the Court has not 
yet analogized the common law right to inspect and copy judicial 
records to the public's right to attend trials. No Supreme Court case 
dealing with the importance of the public's opportunity to attend a 
trial has cited or considered Warner Communications. Perhaps this is 
because the Court believes that the two rights are unrelated. On the 
other hand, the Court may recognize that the holding in Warner Com­
munications is limited to its facts. 53 
Alternatively, one can consider the decision in Richmond News­
papers as recognizing for the first time, a first amendment right of ac­
cess which expands the scope of the first amendment to an extent not 
considered in Warner Communications. It is arguable that Warner 
Communications stands simply for the notion that the press should 
must be rare and only for cause shown that outweighs the value of openness." (footnote 
omitted) (quoting Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572». 
52. See Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 517-18 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Underlying 
the First Amendment right of access to criminal trials is the common understanding that 'a 
major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental af­
fairs.' ") (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966»; Press-Enterprise II, 106 S. 
Ct. at 2744-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens disagreed that there existed a tradi­
tional right of access to preliminary hearings, but believed that, historically, the trial itself 
was open. Id. Justice Stevens believed that first amendment purposes were served by ac­
cess to all parts of the actual trial. Id. Arguably, complete access to trials would include 
access to evidence displayed in open court. 
53. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text. 
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have no more right than the public to government-held information, 
while Richmond Newspapers extends the public's right of access, under 
the first amendment, to criminal trials. Consequently, the holding in 
Richmond Newspapers significantly undermines the constitutional 
analysis in Warner Communications, because the Richmond Newspa­
pers holding modifies the basic assumption in Warner Communications 
that the public has no constitutional right to trial information. 
In the context of the Supreme Court cases recognizing the pub­
lic's right to open trials, it is plausible to conclude that the media's 
right to copy should be included. This is because the right to copy and 
the right to attend trials are indeed related by common purposes. The 
main purpose behind both is the protection of a free flow of informa­
tion to the public, especially when that information concerns an area 
of governmental operation. Another common purpose is to provide 
effective access for the public to observe what happens in the 
courtroom.54 
C. The Supreme Court's Concern for Fair Trials 
While the Supreme Court appears to be in favor of extending the 
public's right to information from criminal trials, the Court also has 
54. In contrast, a strong argument is made that closure orders are of far greater 
significance to the public dialogue than a denial of a request to copy recordings that have 
been played in open court and, therefore, the right to copy should not be based on the right 
to open trials. A closure order completely shuts off public access to information, whereas 
under a copying denial the public can still get information because the media can report on 
what they have observed. In both Warner Communications and Houchins, the Court relied 
on this argument. See supra note 40. 
Such reasoning fails to recognize that at stake in a denial of a media request to copy is 
the ability of the public to receive the actual information contained on the tapes. Persons 
who are unable to be present in the courtroom will be unable to get as accurate information 
as those who could be present, and in effect are closed off from complete understanding of 
what has transpired because of their inability to attend the trial. Denial of a media request 
to copy evidentiary recordings can, therefore, be considered as serious as a closure order. 
The media can, however, playa substitutionary role for the public which is unable to 
attend the trial. To some extent, the media become the eyes and ears of the public, 
although it cannot be doubted that information observed and filtered through the eyes and 
ears of the media is somewhat distorted and conclusive when reported. For certain news, 
this situation is not undesirable, and the distortion is not dangerous. However, the main 
objective behind open trials is that the public has an accurate awareness of what transpired 
in the courtroom. By copying and broadcasting evidentiary recordings, the media help the 
public gain access to a more objective and unanalyzed view of the trial. Without broadcast 
of the actual tapes, the media's role goes beyond that of substitute for the public's eyes and 
ears, and becomes a substitute for the public's judgment. Because the Supreme Court in 
Richmond Newspapers and other cases has declared criminal trials to be an area of govern­
mental operation in which dissemination of information to the public is essential, trial in­
formation should be treated differently from ordinary news. Trial information should be 
reported as accurately as possible and disseminated to the widest extent possible. 
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been very concerned with protecting the defendant's sixth amendment 
right to a fair trial. The Court has held that media pUblicity can affect 
that defendant's right. 55. An example of this recurring theme can be 
found in Supreme Court language supporting the rights of the ac­
cused: "Given the pervasiveness of modern communications and the 
difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, 
the trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is 
never weighed against the accused."56 Conversely, the Court also has 
held that the risk of juror prejudice in some cases does not justify a 
ban on broadcast coverage of a trial, and that a safeguard against such 
prejudice is the defendant's right to demonstrate that the media's cov­
erage has compromised the ability of the jury to be fair. 57 
The basic conflict, therefore, is identified. The public has an in­
terest in receiving information from trials, and the courts have a duty 
to protect defendants from unfair trials. The long-standing conflict 
between these interests has been considered in many contexts. 58 The 
55. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539-40, 552 (1965) (holding that defendant was 
denied a fair trial because televising it had contributed to the trial's "sensationalism" and 
"carnival atmosphere"). 
56. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966). In Sheppard, the Supreme 
Court held that the defendant's trial was not protected adequately from prejudicial public­
ity. The Court offered several suggestions to cure such a problem, such as transferring the 
case, jury sequestration, or a new trial. Id. at 363. For a complete listing of the curative 
measures available to defendants and trial courts when unfairly prejudicial publicity can be 
shown, see infra note 57. 
See also Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378 (1979) (trial judge granted discre­
tion to order closure of a pre-trial hearing in order to protect the defendant's rights). Jus­
tice Blackmun's lengthy dissent in Gannett summarizes attitudes toward a defendant's sixth 
amendment fair trial right. Id. at 406-48 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun's 
opinion, while not precedent, is an example of the language used by the Court in discussing 
fair trial issues. 
The decision in Gannett is considered by many commentators to be greatly affected by 
Richmond Newspapers. See Lewis, A Public Right to Know About Public Institutions: The 
First Amendment as a Sword, 1980 SUP. Cr. REV. I; Comment, Confusion in the Court­
house: The Legacy of the Gannett and Richmond Newspapers Public Right ofAccess Cases, 
59 S. CAL. L. REV. 603 (1986); Note, The First Amendment Right ofAccess to Government­
Held Information, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 292 (1982). 
57. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 575 (1981) (allowing the state to permit televi­
sion coverage of a criminal trial because there was no inherent violation of the defendant's 
rights). 
The defendant has many options for remedying a situation in which he or she can 
show unfairly prejudicial pre-trial publicity, such as: appeal, transfer of the case, jury se­
questration or voir dire examination, curative jury instructions, or even a new trial. The 
options are available to trial court judges when such a showing has been made. For a 
discussion of these measures, see Note, Alternatives Available to Trial Courts to Protect 
Jurorsfrom Prejudicial Publicity, 9 SETON HALL L. REV. 73, 77 (1978). 
58. An example of the Supreme Court's having to decide between the defendant's 
sixth amendment right to a fair trial and the public's first amendment right to an open trial 
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statement in Warner Communications that the light in which factors 
should be weighed is controlled by "the public interest and the duty of 
the courts"59 appears to mean that requests to copy evidentiary re­
cordings will be one more arena for the ongoing conflict between the 
public's right to information and the criminal defendant's right to a 
fair trial. 
It is not clear immediately what principle should be derived from 
this array of Supreme Court decisions when deciding whether to grant 
a media request to copy evidentiary recordings. Because Warner 
Communications did not give the appellate courts a standard to apply 
in reviewing right to copy cases, and in fact left the issue open to trial 
judge discretion, courts at both the appellate and trial levels can ex­
tract from these Supreme Court cases those policy arguments which 
they believe strengthen or weaken arguments in favor of granting re­
quests to copy. 
This ambiguity arising from the majority opinion in Warner 
Communications presents a problem for the federal courts of appeals 
when they consider media requests. The appellate courts do not know 
to what extent the articulated purposes of an open trial support the 
common law right to copy, or how much weight to give the defend­
ant's claim of interference with the fair trial right. The appellate 
courts also do not know the extent of the trial judge's discretion in 
granting or denying requests. These ambiguities have led to variations 
in the treatment of copying requests among the circuits. The next sec­
tion discusses the approaches of several courts of appeals which were 
forced to strike a balance based on this limited Supreme Court 
guidance.6o 
II. THE EARLY CASES: EXTREME VARIATIONS 
A. United States v. Myers 
After Warner Communications, the first cases which involved me-
occurred in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), in which the Court held 
that the public's first amendment right outweighed the defendant's sixth amendment right. 
Id. at 570. There, the trial judge did not articulate the potential harm to the accused when 
giving an order to close some pre-trial proceedings. Id. at 569. For a detailed analysis of 
the case, see the following symposium: Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 29 STAN. L. REV. 
383-626 (1977). 
59. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589, 602 (1978). 
60. Since the cases in the next section also predate some of the Supreme Court deci­
sions discussed above (Richmond Newspapers and the Press-Enterprise cases were decided 
after the initial request to copy cases), Supreme Court guidance may be considered even 
more limited. See supra notes 5-6. 
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dia requests to copy arose out of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's 
Abscam investigations and subsequent trials of several United States 
Congressmen. In In re Application ofNBC (United States v. Myers),61 
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld a district court 
decision granting the media's request to copy a video tape admitted as 
evidence. The tapes showed the defendants, Congressman Michael 
Myers and others, committing the crimes for which they eventually 
were convicted.62 
The Myers court followed the direction of the District of Colum­
bia Circuit Court of Appeals in Mitchell and adopted a strong pre­
sumption in favor of the common law right to inspect and copy.63 In 
qualifying that presumption, the Myers court recognized the two lines 
of authority that influenced its decision: the responsibility of the 
courts to insure a fair trial for the defendant, and the Supreme Court's 
emphasis on "the high public interest in full opportunity to know 
whatever happens in a courtroom ...."64 
The Myers court stated that the possibility of unfairness to the 
defendant, posed by the release of this kind of evidence, was minimal. 
The court claimed that the defendants overestimated the public's 
awareness of news, and claimed that voir dire examination of jurors 
could eliminate any problems.65 The court ended its review of the de­
fendants' rights by concluding that the "alleged risk to a fair trial for 
the Abscam defendants yet to be tried is too speculative to justify de­
nial of the public's right to inspect and copy evidence presented in 
open court. "66 
The Myers court also reasoned that the fact that the tapes con­
tained evidence of the behavior of high public officials, and that the 
61. 635 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980). See supra note 5. 
62. Id. at 947. For a description of the tapes and excerpts from their contents see 
Note, The Common Law Right ofAccess to Taped Evidence, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 465, 
482-83 (1982). 
63. Myers, 635 F.2d at 952. 
64. Id. at 951. The court also looked specifically at Mitchell and a case decided by a 
New York state court, Hearst Corp. v. Vogt, 62 A.D.2d 840, 406 N.Y.S.2d 567 (1978). 
These cases fall within the two broad categories of cases recognized by the court. The 
opinion in Mitchell supports the presumption in favor of protecting the public's interest in 
what goes on in the courtroom, Myers, 635 F.2d at 950, while the Mitchell court inter­
preted the opinion in Vogt as supporting strong protection of the defendant's fair trial 
rights. Id. at 951. 
65. Myers, 635 F.2d at 953. The court also reminded the defendants of the immense 
publicity surrounding the Watergate trials and of the fact that it was possible to impanel an 
impartial jury and to insure a fair trial for the Watergate defendants. See also supra note 
57. 
66. Id. at 954. See supra note 28. 
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tapes already were played in open court, intensified the common law 
right to copy.67 The Myers court also emphasized the Supreme Court 
decision in Richmond Newspapers and viewed its policy discussions as 
favorable to strengthening the common law right to copy judicial 
records.68 
The Myers case, while decided before the more recent Supreme 
Court cases which seek to recognize the public's right to have criminal 
proceedings open to them, marks the farthest extension of the com­
mon law right to copy evidentiar~. recordings recognized by the 
courts.69 
B. United States v. Criden 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Application of NBC 
(United States v. Criden),70 also gave the common law right a strong 
presumption. In Criden, the court reversed a district court decision 
denying a media request to copy Abscam tapes.71 The district court 
attempted to define the media's right by looking exclusively to Warner 
Communications for support, and by disagreeing with the "expansive 
view of the common law right of access" espoused by the Courts of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia and the Second Circuit. 72 The 
district court judge also concluded that "whatever the force of the pre­
sumption [in favor of disclosure], I am ... convinced that the circum­
stances of the present case are indeed sufficiently extraordinary to 
require denial of the broadcasters' application."73 
In reversing the trial court's denial, the Criden court analogized 
the interests identified in Warner Communications to the interests 
identified in Richmond Newspapers,74 while it also made it clear that it 
67. Id. at 952. The court stated that only "the most extraordinary circumstances 
[could] justify restrictions on the opportunity" for the media to play the tapes for those 
who could not be in the courtroom to hear them. Id. The court also recognized that there 
was no dispute over protecting the physical integrity of the tapes, as all parties agreed that 
the system set up to copy the tapes was adequate for their protection. Recall the concern 
for the physical integrity of the tapes expressed by Judge MacKinnon in his dissent in 
Mitchell, supra note 30. 
68. Myers, 635 F.2d at 951·52. See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. 
69. The Myers case was decided in 1980, shortly after the decision in Richmond 
Newspapers, but prior to the Supreme Court decisions in Globe Newspaper Co. (1982), and 
Press-Enterprise (I and II) (1984 and 1986). 
70. 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981). 
71. [d. at 814-15. See supra note 5. 
72. Id. at 816 (quoting Judge Fullam's opinion in United States v. Criden, 501 F. 
Supp. 854, 859 (E.D. Pa. 1980)). 
73. Id. 
74. [d. at 820. ("[T]he interests identified by the Court in Warner Communications 
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was not ruling on a pure first amendment issue.75 The court asserted 
that the involvement of high government officials and the issue of the 
integrity of law enforcement heightened the public's interest in the 
tapes.76 Once again, the court weighed heavily the fact that the tapes 
already had been played in open court.77 The court concluded that 
these factors clearly outweighed the risks to the defendants' right to a 
fair trial because those risks were based solely on conjecture, and be­
cause it would not be too difficult to impanel an impartial jury given 
the defendants' opportunity for voir dire examination.78 As a further 
protection, the defendants could show on appeal that the jury had 
been inft uenced unfairly. 79 
~he Criden court also looked to other Supreme Court cases for 
suggestions on how to avoid unfairly prejudicial pre-trial publicity.80 
Lastly, the court suggested that the similarity between live broadcast 
of a trial and rebroadcast of tape evidence might lead to similar effects 
on the administration of a trial, hinting that such cases should be 
treated the same way.81 
Judge Weis wrote separately in Criden, disagreeing with the 
strong presumption given to the common law right by the majority. 82 
He suggested that the Supreme Court in Warner Communications had 
"pointedly declined to accept the D.C. Circuit's standard" in the 
Mitchell case, and that courts should not give the presumption in favor 
of public access a quasi-constitutional stature by reinforcing it with the 
as supporting the right to access, 'the citizen's desire to keep a watchful eye on the work­
ings of public agencies' and publication of 'information concerning the operations of gov­
ernment,' are identical to the interests identified in . . . Richmond Newspapers . . . .") 
(quoting Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 598). 
75. Id. at 820. 
76. Id. at 821-22. 
77. Id. at 822-26. See supra note 27. 
78. Id. at 826-28. See supra notes 28, 57. 
79. Id. 
80. rd. at 827-28. The court cited Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981), and 
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). See supra note 57 for a listing of the 
curative measures available for unfairly prejudicial pre-trial pUblicity. 
81. Criden, 648 F.2d at 828-29. The effects created would be due to the incremental 
increase in publicity over that which would occur anyway through general reporting on the 
trial. See supra note 27. 
The Supreme Court has held that live broadcast of a trial is not an inherent violation 
of the defendant's rights. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 575 (1981). See supra note 57 
and accompanying text. 
82. Criden, 648 F.2d at 830-33 (Weis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Judge Weis believed that the court should remand the case for further consideration. He 
said that any unfairly prejudicial material should be edited from the tapes. He also believed 
that the majority had misapplied the holding in Richmond Newspapers. 
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constitutional right to attend trials. 83 Judge Weis also stated that the 
common law right to copy should only be "one factor to be consid­
ered" in deciding a media request. 84 Judge Weis' opinion was the first 
attempt to recognize Warner Communications as the sole source of 
direction for appellate courts on the issue of media requests to copy 
evidentiary recordings.85 
Judge Weis' analysis helps clarify the basic dispute which exists 
throughout all of the right to copy cases. The determinative question 
in these cases is who has the benefit of presumption. If the presump­
tion is that the media request be granted, then the defendants have the 
burden of proving an infringement on their sixth amendment rights. 
On the other hand, if the presumption is in favor of protecting the 
sixth amendment right at the expense of the media's right to copy, 
then the media has the burden of disproving a sixth amendment in­
fringement. Because the factors to be proved are so speculative, the 
party with the burden of proof has a difficult task. Thus, determining 
which party has the burden of proof, by determining which side has 
the benefit of the presumption, predicts the outcome of each media 
request case. 
The troubling effect of the Supreme Court~s lack of guidance on 
this issue is apparent under this presumption analysis. When a consti­
tutional right (the defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair trial) 
conflicts with a common law right which is just a "factor to be consid­
ered," the balance undoubtedly favors the party with the constitu­
tional right. A presumption always exists in favor of protecting a 
constitutional right over a conflicting common law right, when the 
constitutional right is endangered. 86 Therefore, a common law right 
83. Id. at 831. 
84. Id. Judge Weis claimed the other factors to be the defendant's fair trial right and 
the trial judge's concern for unfairly prejudicial publicity. The judge also referred to the 
privacy rights of those on the tapes and the fact that the tapes concerned public officials. 
Id. at 832-33. Judge Weis based these factors and the weight given to each on impressions 
of the constitutional nature of the defendant's right to a fair trial versus the public's right of 
accuracy in information and the desire for a gain in understanding. Id. at 831-33. 
85. Judge Weis' opinion has gained some favor recently. See Valley Broadcasting 
Co. v. District Court, 798 F.2d 1289, 1296 n.9 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Beckham, 
789 F.2d 401, 413 (6th Cir. 1986); infra notes 110-23, 127-35 and accompanying text. 
86. See Note, supra note 43, at 126-28. What makes the presumption analysis more 
confusing is the fact that some courts of appeals have stated that they recognize a presump­
tion of granting media requests, when they are in fact severely limiting the scope of that 
presumption because of their stronger presumption in favor of protecting defendant's fair 
trial rights. Thus, in reality there is no presumption in favor of granting requests, although 
initially it is stated as such. See United States v. Beckham, 789 F.2d 401 (6th Cir. 1986), 
infra notes 110-23 and accompanying text; United States v. Edwards, 672 F.2d 1289 (7th 
Cir. 1982), infra notes 101-09 and accompanying text. . 
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to copy, without constitutional underpinnings such as those offered by 
the Myers and Criden courts, seems to have no presumption in its 
favor. 
The presumption to grant media requests, however, is not neces­
sarily doomed if the defendant's constitutional right is not considered 
endangered. The presumption in favor of common law over a consti­
tutional right is permissible if the danger to the constitutional right is 
based on a small risk, weak hypothesis, or conjecture. Some courts 
have used exactly this approach in determining the scope of the me­
dia's right to copy evidentiary recordings.87 
C. United States v. Jenrette 
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in In re NBC 
(United States v. Jenrette)88 was the third appellate court to consider 
media requests to copy Abscam tape evidence. The Jenrette court also 
reversed a district court denial of a request, relying on Myers and 
Mitchell. The court stated that the tapes should be considered "public 
property" because they had been played in open court,89 and that the 
public has a substantial interest in the judicial process and in charges 
against public officials.90 These factors strengthened the presumption 
in favor of granting access to copy and were enough to overcome the 
right of the defendant to a fair trial in light of the "therapeutic" meas­
ures available to insure an impartial jury.91 
The court in Jenrette, unlike the courts in Myers and Criden, did 
not cite Richmond Newspapers to support the common law right to 
copy.92 The Jenrette court did, however, provide a strong presump­
tion to the right to copy even though the court did not find specific 
constitutional support for it.93 The court stated that constitutional 
support was not necessary for the common law right to overcome the 
defendant's right to a fair trial. The Jenrette decision, therefore, is an 
87. See, e.g., Valley Broadcasting Co. v. District Court, 798 F.2d 1289, 1293-94 (9th 
Cir. 1986), infra notes 127-35 and accompanying text; United States v. Jenrette, 653 F.2d 
609,613 (D.C. Cir. 1981), infra notes 88-93 and accompanying text. 
88. 653 F.2d 609 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See supra note 5. 
89. Id. at 614 (citing Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1261, which had relied on Craig v. Har­
ney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947». 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 616-18. The court also referred to Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 
U.S. 539 (1976). For further suggestions on insuring an impartial jury, see supra notes 56­
57. 
92. Jenrette, 653 F.2d at 614 ("[T]he public's First Amendment right of access to the 
trial itself was fully respected in this case ...." Id. (footnote omitted». This is the only 
reference in Jenrette to Richmond Newspapers. 
93. Id. at 614-18. 
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example of a court finding a common law right strong enough to over­
come a constitutional right because the court did not perceive the risk 
to the constitutional right to be great. 
D. Bela Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark 
The first federal court of appeals to deny media access to eviden­
tiary recordings was the Fifth Circuit in Bela Broadcasting Corp. v. 
Clark. 94 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals took the opposite view 
from that of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Myers, holding 
that it was not the duty of the appellate court to forecast the future 
difficulty of a fair trial, and allowing the trial judge wide discretion.95 
Relying wholly on Warner Communications, the Bela Broadcasting 
court, while acknowledging the ambiguity of the Supreme Court's lan­
guage concerning the scope of trial judge discretion, followed Justice 
Stevens' dissent in holding that "[o]nly an egregious abuse of discre­
tion should merit [lower court] reversal."96 Thus, according to Bela 
Broadcasting, an appellate court generally should defer to the lower 
court judge's determinations, and review only for a blatant abuse of 
discretion. 
In its review of the lower court decision, the Bela' Broadcasting 
court sustained the trial judge's view that the defendant's constitu­
tional right to a fair trial overcame the media's rights, which the court 
described as "less compelling," "non-constitutional," and unrelated to 
any first amendment concerns.97 In light of this reasoning, it is easy to 
see why the court concluded by stating: "It is better to err, if err we 
must, on the side of generosity in the protection of a defendant's right 
to a fair trial before an impartial jury. "98 The presumption in favor of 
access to copy, which had been considered strong in comparison to the 
speculative risk to a defendant's fair trial in Myers, Criden, and Jen­
94. 654 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981). In Bela Broadcasting, the media 
wanted to copy tapes of conversations in which the defendants (among them the Speaker of 
the Texas House of Representatives) made illegal deals with FBI agents posing as business­
. men in a sting operation coined "Brilab." 	See Note, Bela Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark: No 
Access to Taped Evidence, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 257 (1982). 
95. Bela Broadcasting, 654 F.2d at 430-33. 
96. Id. at 431 (citing Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 614 (Stevens, J., dissent­
ing». Justice Stevens believed that the trial judge was best able to perceive the circum­
stances of the case and, therefore, possible misadministration of justice. Warner 
Communications, 435 U.S. at 615 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra note 36. See also Bela 
Broadcasting, 654 F.2d at 431 n.18. 
97. Bela Broadcasting, 654 F.2d at 432. The court refused to balance a free press 
right and a fair trial right, saying that the issue "is not before us." Id. 
98. Id. at 431. 
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rette,99 was considered in Bela Broadcasting to be no presumption at 
all in light of the trial judge's determination that some risk to the de­
fendant's fair trial existed. loo 
E. United States v. Edwards 
In 1982, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals attempted to rec­
oncile the extreme positions taken in the Abscam cases and Bela 
Broadcasting when it reviewed a media request to copy evidentiary 
recordings in a case arising out .of an investigation into the corrupt 
practices of an Indiana state senator. 101 In In re Video-Indiana, Inc. 
(United States v. Edwards),102 the court borrowed language from both 
the Abscam cases and Bela Broadcasting. The Edwards court stated 
that there was· a presumption in favor of granting access, and cited 
Mitchell for the proposition that the "common law right supports and 
furthers many of the same interests which underlie those freedoms 
protected by the Constitution."103 The court in Edwards, citing Bela 
Broadcasting, also admitted that "a number of factors may militate 
against public access."I04 The Edwards court's conclusion permits de­
nial of access "only on the basis of articulable facts known to the 
court, not on the basis of unsupported hypothesis or conjecture."105 A 
trial court must clearly state its reasons for denying access so that the 
appellate court can decide if "relevant factors were considered and 
given appropriate weight."106 The court's conclusion, while going be­
yond Bela Broadcasting by requiring a clear articulation of factors for 
appellate review, does not go as far as the Abscam cases in its pre­
sumption that access should be granted. The court does not reach the 
level of presumption of access given in the Abscam cases because the 
court is satisfied that when any number of factors have been articu­
lated clearly, the presumption is outweighed. 
Having established these governing principles, the Edwards court 
reviewed the trial record to determine if the judge had articulated suf­
99. See supra text accompanying notes 61-93. 
100. See supra text accompanying note 97. 
101. In re Video-Indiana, Inc., 672 F.2d 1289 (7th Cir. 1982) (United States v. Ed­
wards). The evidence in question was tape recordings of phone conversations between Sen­
ator Edwards and a private businessman discussing the exchange of money for legislative 
influence. Id. at 1290-91. 
102. 672 F.2d 1289 (7th Cir. 1982). 
103. Id. at 1294 (relying on Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1258). This argument is similar to 
those articulated in the Abscam cases. For a review of these interests, see supra note 21. 
104. Edwards, 672 F.2d at 1294 (quoting Belo Broadcasting, 654 F.2d at 434). 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
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ficient reasons to warrant denial of access. In deciding that a denial 
was warranted, the court did not engage in any independent consider­
ation of competing factors, but rather deferred to the trial judge's de­
terminations. 107 The Edwards court refused to apply a broad rule 
concerning media requests to copy, insisting that all future requests 
would be considered on a case-by-case basis. !Os 
In giving the presumption in favor of access some constitutional 
support, but at the same time allowing almost any of the trial judge's 
articulated factors to warrant a denial of access,109 the Edwards deci­
sion resembled the Belo Broadcasting case more than the Abscam 
cases. The Edwards court effectively gave itself only a minimal avenue 
for reversing a lower court decision to deny access and, at the same 
time, adopted a confusing and unenforceable standard to guide lower 
court judges in making their decisions. 
The differing standards which resulted from the Abscam cases 
and Belo Broadcasting are related directly to the lack of clear Supreme 
Court guidance on the issue. The reasonable conclusions in those 
cases are supported by sensible readings of Warner Communications 
and other cases dealing with trial openness. The Edwards case, while 
attempting to strike a middle ground between the Abscam cases and 
Belo Broadcasting, is really an example of the difficulties that can re­
sult when an appellate court attempts to borrow language from cases 
at both ends of the spectrum. The Edwards case foreshadows the diffi­
culties encountered by the courts in the more recent cases, discussed in 
the next section, which also attempt to strike a balance between the 
two extremes. 
107. Id. at 1295. The Edwards decision seems internally inconsistent. While de­
manding articulated facts in order to review the trial judge's decision, the appellate court 
did not, in fact, decide whether the trial judge's reasons were sufficient to deny access. 
Instead, the appellate court deferred to the trial judge's discretion. The court did this be­
cause it believed that the weight given to each of the factors depends on the trial's factual 
setting, in which the trial judge is deemed best able to determine the interests of the parties. 
The appellate court, therefore, would not enforce any of the suggestions it had stated re­
garding the strength of the media's right. Id. 
108. Id. at 1296. 
109. The court used language which suggested that certain arguments alone would 
be insufficient to convince the appellate court to affirm the trial judge's determination. For 
exarnple, the court rejected reliance on a Judicial Conference resolution prohibiting the 
broadcasting of trials. Id. at 1295. The court also cast doubt on arguments that the jury in 
the ongoing trial would be unfairly influenced, and that grave harm could result at a future 
trial. Id. at 1295-96. Despite this language, the court's final decision deferred to the trial 
judge's speculation on the latter two factors, in effect giving no substance to its own 
suggestions. 
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III. THE RECENT CASES: ATTEMPTED MODERATION 
A. United States v. Beckham 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently upheld a district 
court judge's denial of a media request to copy evidentiary recordings 
in United States v. Beckham. lIo In a lengthy opinion, Judge Jones first 
addressed the constitutional grounds on which the media claimed a 
right to copy. Refusing to apply the constitutional principles of Rich­
mond Newspapers, Judge Jones held that the media's opportunity to be 
in the courtroom and report on what they had observed satisfied all 
constitutional claims. III Relying on the Supreme Court's opinion in 
Warner Communications, the Beckham· majority emphasized that the 
constitutional principles which give the media access to the courtroom 
did not give the media a special right of access to copy what they 
heard. I 12 
The Beckham court considered the common law arguments sepa­
rately from the constitutional ones. Instead of using the constitutional 
arguments and their underlying values as support for the common law 
right, the court said that the defendant's constitutional right to a fair 
trial outweighed any public benefit to be received by granting access 
under the common law right to inspect and copy. I \3 The court found 
that the trial judge articulated and weighed the appropriate factors. 
Reminiscent of Edwards, the Beckham court afforded the trial judge 
substantial discretion, only requiring a reasoned summary of the argu­
ments for denying access. 114 Once again, the court's conclusion at­
110. 789 F.2d 401 (6th Cir. 1986). The evidence requested was audio tape record­
ings of persons accused of defrauding the City of Detroit. A city official was included 
among the defendants. Before the appeal on the denial of access took place, the trial ended 
and the media then received access to copy the tapes. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
declared, however, that the appeal was not moot because the legal issues presented were 
capable of repetition and evading review. Id. at 403-05. 
Ill. /d. at 406-09, 413-15. The court stated that the "open trial" cases did not apply 
because their purpose was to protect against the total restriction of information, whereas 
here, the media's access to information was not restricted totally, since they were able to 
attend the trial (in fact, the press was given preferential seating) and observe the presenta­
tion of the tapes 'in open court. Therefore, any "fundamental right to know" had not been 
abridged; only an unrelated right to copy was involved. Id. at 414-15. See supra notes 40, 
54. The court disagreed with, and distinguished the arguments offered by the courts in the 
Abscam cases for the same reasons. Id. at 413-14. 
The media also requested documentary evidence which did not include evidentiary 
recordings. The appellate court granted this request. Id. at 412. 
112. Id. at 408-09. Recall the Supreme Court's handling of this issue in Warner 
Communications where it interpreted Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 
(1975). See supra text accompanying notes 39-41. See also supra note 54. 
113. Beckham, 789 F.2d at 409-10. 
114. See supra text accompanying notes 105-06. 
124 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:99 
tempts to strike a middle ground between the "compelling" arguments 
necessary to deny access in Myers and the wide discretion allowed in 
Bela Broadcasting. I IS 
The court's ensuing examination of the trial judge's reasoning, 
however, made it clear that the trial judge possessed a wide degree of 
discretion which, in effect, negated the court of appeals' power of re­
view. The Beckham court deferred to the trial judge's opinion on all 
relevant factors.116 The court reasoned that because the trial judge 
was able to make first hand observations, and had primary responsibil­
ity for providing a fair trial, the decision to deny media access to copy 
was not an abuse of discretion even though it may have been "overly 
cautious."117 Thus, while the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals requires 
an articulation of the factors, its review of the trial judge's decision is 
very deferential. Like Edwards, the Beckham court ended up with a 
standard quite similar to that used in Bela Broadcasting, leaving the 
trial judge to determine the strength of the common law right of access 
to copy evidentiary recordings. 
The Beckham decision presents the two questions confronting ap­
pellate courts when they review a lower court decision on a media 
request to copy. The first question concerns the strength of the com­
mon law right. Its strength ranges from a strong presumption sup­
ported by Supreme Court decisions protecting the rights of the public 
to courtroom information, as seen in the Abscam cases,118 to a pre­
sumption which is merely one factor to be considered in light of the 
defendant's right to a fair trial, and, therefore, no presumption at 
115. See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text for discussion of Myers and notes 
94-100 and accompanying text for discussion of Bela Broadcasting. 
The Beckham court agreed with the reasoning of the Criden court that trial judges 
need to articulate reasons for denying a request, and that when public officials are recorded 
on the tapes the public's interest in the tapes is heightened. However, the Beckham court 
ruled consistently with the result reached by the dissent in Criden by holding that the 
majority in Criden misapplied Richmond Newspapers. Beckham, 789 F.2d at 412-13. See 
supra notes 82-85. 
The Beckham court disagreed with the Jenrette and Mitchell courts, stating that those 
courts were looking only at the importance of the availability of information when they 
reached their conclusions. Beckham, 789 F.2d at 414. 
116. Beckham, 789 F.2d at 415. Among the district court's findings were "that the 
curative powers of sequestration, voir dire and cautionary instructions would be insuffi­
cient," and that reliance on those curative measures would result in unfairly limiting the 
size and diversity of a jury pool. The district court also found "that the increase in public­
ity from the [tapes] ... would affect the already hostile community atmosphere to a degree 
that would pervade the entire community." Id. The court deferred to these and several 
other trial judge determinations. 
117. Id. 
118. See supra notes 61-74 and accompanying text. 
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all. 119 The second question concerns which court will determine the 
relevant factors and their weight. The answer ranges from the Myers 
court's active appellate review,120 to the almost unbridled lower court 
discretion advocated by Justice Stevens in Warner Communications, 121 
and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Belo Broadcasting.122 In 
Beckham, although the court sought to hear the trial judge's reasons 
for denying access, review of the reasons was as superficial as that 
undertaken in Belo Broadcasting. In this way, the Beckham court 
never reached the first issue of how strong the media's right should be, 
because the court only made unenforced suggestions as to the strength 
of the presumption in favor of granting access.123 
B. United States v. Webbe 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Webbe 124 
defined the scope of trial judge discretion in determining the media's 
right to evidentiary recordings. In Webbe, the court followed Belo 
Broadcasting on the issue of discretion and deferred to the district 
court's judgment on the factors that it considered. 125 In a short opin­
ion, the Webbe court simply reviewed the list of factors considered by 
the district court judge, and determined that the court's response to 
those factors was reasonable, and thus affirmed the decision denying 
the media's request. 126 
119. As seen in Bela Broadcasting, supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text. 
120. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
121. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589, 615 (1978). See supra note 36 and text 
accompanying supra note 95. 
122. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. 
123. The lengthy dissent in Beckham, written by Judge Contie, argued for a strong 
presumption in favor of granting access. Judge Contie was concerned with the first un­
resolved aspect, the strength of the right to copy. Even Judge Contie did not, however, 
address the level of scrutiny applied to trial judge discretion. Courts must address both 
unresolved issues in order to clarify the current state of the media's right. Beckham, 789 
F.2d at 415, 425 (Con tie, J., dissenting). 
Judge Contie went so far as to say that Supreme Court decisions concerning "open 
trials" apply directly to the flow of information to the public in the form of recorded evi­
dence of public officials and, therefore, the Constitution requires the granting of media 
requests to copy. Id. 
124. 791 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1986). In Webbe. the media sought audio tapes admitted 
as evidence in a trial charging a city official with voting fraud and obstruction ofjustice. At 
the time of the appeal, the defendant already had pleaded guilty and the media had received 
written transcripts of the tapes. CBS (arguing for the media) claimed on appeal that the 
lower court erred in denying its request to copy the tapes, arguing for a strong presumption 
like that in Myers. Id. at 104-05. 
125. Id. at 106. 
126. /d. at 106-07. The court simply restated the trial judge's determinations, giving 
great weight to the fact that the media were allowed to attend the trial and to receive 
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In Webbe, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals appears not to 
have given the common law right to copy any presumption. Had the 
trial judge determined, however, that the common law right was 
stronger than the defendant's constitutional claims and granted the 
request, the court in Webbe might also have deferred to the lower 
court's judgment. While the Webbe opinion makes clear the court's 
substantial defer~nce to the trial court, it is less clear in resolving the 
strength of the common law right. By so doing, the Webbe court does 
not answer the primary question of what the media's right should be, 
except to hold that the trial judge can determine its extent in each 
case. 
C. Valley Broadcasting Co. v. District Court 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the media's right 
to copy evidentiary recordings in Valley Broadcasting Co. v. District 
Court.127 In that case, the court reversed a district court decision de­
nying access to audio and video tapes. 128 The opinion in Valley Broad­
casting addressed all aspects of the media's right to copy. The Valley 
Broadcasting court discounted the media's direct constitutional argu­
ments,129 choosing instead a "middle ground stance," like the one pre­
ferred in Edwards.130 The court concluded, however, that the reasons 
asserted by the district court were inadequate to overcome a strong 
presumption in favor of access. 131 
In reversing the district court's request denial, the Valley Broad­
casting court reasoned that the district court's concern for the physical 
integrity of the tapes was unfounded because a reasonably safe system 
had been established for copying. \32 The court also dismissed the 
transcripts of the tapes. The court also afforded deference to the judge's determinations 
that the current and future trials of Webbe would be adversely affected by a release of the 
tapes, and that a future trial was" 'more than merely hypothetical.' .. Id. at 107 (quoting 
United States v. Edwards, 672 F.2d 1289, 1296 (7th Cir. 1982». 
127. 798 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1986). In Valley Broadcasting, the media requested 
immediate release of both audio and video tape evidence which was admitted into evidence 
in United States v. Spilotro, No. 83-115 (D. Nev. Sept. 4, 1986), a prominent RICO con­
spiracy case in Nevada. Id. at 1290. 
128. Valley Broadcasting Co., 798 F.2d at 1294, 1297. The court ruled on a petition 
for a writ of mandamus. Using the mandamus procedure, the media brought the issue to 
the appellate level immediately. On a writ of mandamus petition, the appellate court had 
to find the district court's decision "clearly erroneous as a matter of law" in order to re­
verse, which the court did. Id. at 1291-92. 
129. Jd. at 1292-93. 
130. Id. at 1293. 
131. Id. at 1294. 
132. Id. at 1295. 
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lower court's concern for preventing unfairly prejudicial pUblicity 
which would affect the jury in a future trial because that concern is 
based on conjecture and speculation. The same reasons prompted the 
court of appeals to reject the argument that the jury in the ongoing 
case would be tainted. 133 
Thus, the court in Valley Broadcasting created a strong presump­
tion in favor of granting media requests to copy without using consti­
tutional supports. The non-constitutional presumption was strong 
enough to overcome the argument that the defendants' constitutional 
right to a fair trial was endangered. The court based this conclusion 
on its perception that unfair prejudice was conjectural and speculative. 
Therefore, in light of the common law presumption in favor of grant­
ing access, the media received the tapes. 
Another important dimension in Valley Broadcasting was the 
court's refusal to follow the trial judge's determination that the poten­
tial unfair prejudice to the defendants should prohibit release of the 
tapes. 134 Using language from Edwards as support, the Valley Broad­
casting court insisted that the trial judge be given substantial discre­
tion in determining whether to grant or deny a media request. 135 
However, under the Valley Broadcasting holding, the exercise of trial 
judge discretion is not unreviewable. This is a significant departure 
from Edwards, which deferred greatly to the trial judge's determina­
tion on the issue of possible prejudicial publicity. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has given some bite to its 
standard of review. The court required that the trial judge articulate 
not just the existence of a potential for unfair prejudice, but also the 
factual basis for the danger.136 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
therefore, created a stricter standard of review than the Edwards and 
Beckham courts for lower court determinations that the defendant 
may be unfairly prejudiced by publicity arising from the media's pres­
133. Id. at 1294-97. 
134. Id. at 1296 n.13. 
135. Id. at 1295. 
136. Id. The court stated: 
The only potential prejudice appropriate for consideration by the district court 
was, therefore, the added prejudice that might result from broadcasting excerpts 
of the tapes as opposed to simply describing their contents. While we recognize 
that the added danger of jury taint arising from the transmission of the tapes 
themselves may vary from case to case, we reemphasize that the district court 
must articulate the factual basis for the danger without relying on hypothesis or 
conjecture. 
Id. 
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entation of evidentiary recordings. 137 The Ninth Circuit Court of Ap­
peals assigned the right to copy a strong presumption while still 
discounting any constitutional supports for the common law right to 
copy. It is thus the true middle ground approach between the Abscam 
cases and Belo Broadcasting. 
These recent cases put into proper perspective the current status 
of the media's right to copy evidentiary recordings. In their efforts to 
guarantee justice, the Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Ap­
peals borrow language from conflicting lines of early cases which seek 
either to recognize or deny constitutional support to the common law 
right to copy. 138 The recent cases all agree that the common law right 
to copy is not absolute, and that certain factors will militate against 
release of evidentiary recordings. The cases also require justification 
from a trial judge for denying a media request to copy. None of the 
courts, however, are willing to accept the Myers court's quasi-constitu­
tional stance. 
The Webbe opinion embraces Belo Broadcasting wholeheartedly 
on the issue of trial judge discretion, while the Beckham majority 
opinion, attempting to strike a middle ground, resembles Belo Broad­
casting because of its deference to lower court determinations. The 
only recent decision which truly achieves a middle ground between the 
two extremes of the Abscam cases and Belo Broadcasting is Valley 
Broadcasting. That case borrows language from both ends of the spec­
trum in determining the strength of the media's right, and also re­
quires both a clear articulation of a lower court's reasoning and a 
standard of review which enables the appellate court to examine care­
fully the relevant factors considered below. The Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit effectively controls the definition of the scope of the 
137. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has had experience with the issue of pre­
trial pUblicity. In CBS v. District Court, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1529 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(United States v. DeLorean), the court held that the threat of unfair pre-trial publicity did 
not justify a prior restraint on the media from broadcasting tapes already in their posses­
sion. Id. at 1535. The DeLorean case is distinguishable from Valley Broadcasting because 
the media already possessed the tapes which they wished to play for the public. The deci­
sion is important, however, because the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals summarized its 
conclusions about the speculative and conjectural nature of pre-trial publicity in the form 
of broadcasted tape evidence. Id. 
138. See Beckham, supra notes 110-23 and accompanying text; Webbe, supra notes 
124-26 and accompanying text; Valley Broadcasting, supra notes 127-37 and accompanying 
text. 
See also the Abscam cases, supra notes 61-93 and accompanying text; Bela Broadcast­
ing, supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text; Edwards, supra notes 101-09 and accompa­
nying text. 
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media's right to copy evidentiary recordings. 139 
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The status of the media's right to copy evidentiary recordings is 
dependent upon the appellate courts' answers to two equally impor­
tantquestions. The first question asks what is the strength of the me­
dia's common law right to access; the second question asks which 
court, the trial court or the appellate court, will determine the relevant 
factors and their weight. Depending on the jurisdiction, the strength 
of the media's right ranges from quasi-constitutional to just one factor 
to be weighed in light of the defendant's fair trial right. l40 Also vary­
ing among the courts of appeals is the degree of deference afforded to 
lower court determinations regarding the relevant factors and their 
weight when deciding whether to grant a media request to copy evi­
dentiary recordings. 141 
The opinions discussed in Parts II and III of this comment illus­
trate that the status of the media's right to copy varies among the 
jurisdictions. Arguments for or against strengthening the media's 
right are not hard to make. One reasonably can elevate the right by 
analogizing it to the public's right to open trials. 142 It is just as reason­
able to make the argument that those two rights are unrelated and that 
the common law right is greatly outweighed by the defendant's right 
to a fair trial. 143 
An objective assessment of the real issue in a right to copy case 
compels a standard between the two extremes offered by the early 
cases. The underlying issue is the long-standing debate over the 
proper balance between the public's right to information and the de­
fendants' rights to fair trials. The key word is balance. There must be 
a balance between the media's argument that the public has a right to 
hear evidentiary recordings, and the defendants' argument that their 
constitutional rights deserve strict protection. l44 
It is important that there be a presumption in favor of granting 
139. See supra notes 127-37. 
140: See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text. 
141. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text. 
142. See Myers, supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text; Criden, supra notes 70-87 
and accompanying text; Note, supra note 43, at 126-28. 
143. See, e.g., Bela Broadcasting, supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text; Criden, 
(Weis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), supra notes 82-85 and accompanying 
text; Note, supra note 16, at 556. 
144. An argument can be made that the solution to this balancing dilemma should be 
left to legislatures that should recognize a right of access while providing appropriate con­
straints. See Note, supra note 4. 
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media access to evidentiary recordings. This means that courts should 
assume a posture which would grant all media requests to copy, given 
that the tapes' proper care is assured and that the media's purpose is, 
indeed, the dissemination to the public of accurate trial information. 145 
This presumption is necessary because the purpose of copying and dis­
seminating evidentiary recordings is to insure that the public knows 
what transpires within its government and its institutions. The inter­
est is intensified when a government official is the subject of the 
recording. 
The presumption in favor of granting media requests, however, in 
no way can be considered absolute, and need not be afforded a quasi­
constitutional status. A trial judge should be able to deny a request 
upon sufficient reason. The only justifiable reason for denying a re­
quest is protection of a defendant's constitutional fair trial right. If 
that right truly is in jeopardy, the defendant's constitutional right out­
weighs the media's common law right. Because the disclosure leads to 
only an incremental increase in publicity, and the courts have numer­
ous remedies for unfairly prejudicial publicity, these exceptions will be 
rare. 
An abuse of discretion arises when a trial judge denies access be­
cause he or she perceives the defendant's fair trial right to be in jeop­
ardy, even though the defendant's right is not truly threatened. 146 
Because of this, an appellate court should require clearly articulated 
reasons for the denial. Thus, a media request would be denied only 
when an appellate court agreed with the trial judge's denial. The pre­
sumption in favor of granting access would remain a presumption, but 
subject to rare exceptions under particular circumstances brought to 
the appellate court's attention. 147 This is the approach taken in Valley 
145. For example, the request could be denied where it could be shown that the 
media's purpose was strictly commercial, exploitive, or in some other way motivated by 
personal animosity toward the accused. The interest to be protected here is the privacy 
interest of those on the tapes. When the media is not claiming an interest related to the 
public's right to know, the scales easily tip in favor of protecting the interests of those 
parties on the tapes who seek to deny access. 
146. An example of this would be the situation in Valley Broadcasting where there 
were insufficient facts to support the trial judge's conclusions that the defendant's fair trial 
right was in jeopardy. 
147. An exception occurs when a trial judge can tell the appellate court about spe­
cific happenings surrounding the trial or the tapes which would be affected by the tapes' 
release. These circumstances could include such things as a history of violence concerning 
some aspect of the trial (a matter involving community race conflicts, for instance), or 
material on the tapes which will elicit an extreme emotional reaction by those who observe 
it (recordings of an actual rape or murder, for instance). In these instances, potential jurors 
may be so affected that it may be impossible to impanel a future impartial jury. 
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Broadcasting. There, the trial judge could not make the necessary ar­
ticulation of the danger to the defendant's fair trial right, and the ap­
pellate court, therefore, did not allow an exception. 
In the absence of clear Supreme Court guidance, the Valley 
Broadcasting standard is a workable one. The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Valley Broadcasting has properly synthesized the Supreme 
Court's guidance on the issues, giving the two interests at stake correct 
weight by recognizing a strong presumption in favor of granting media 
requests, but allowing an avenue for the defendant's constitutional fair 
trial right to override it. The question of the strength of the media's 
right probably will not be answered definitively until the Supreme 
Court decides a case identifying a standard which evaluates the right 
to copy evidentiary recordings. 148 
James K. Foster 
148. There are, however, inherent difficulties in getting such a case before the Court. 
For example, it is not clear who will bring the appeal. By the time the Court renders a 
decision, the value of getting the tapes in anyone case would be greatly diminished. This 
fact decreases the incentive for the media to devote resources to pursuing a Supreme Court 
appeal once they have lost at the appellate level. A defendant who loses below will not 
bring an appeal if the tapes already have been released, because any damage to the defend­
ant's trial already has occurred. 
